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INTRODUCTION 
 With the slow down of the economic growth, most welfare states have learned 
the painful lesson that it is increasingly difficult for the government to support the 
escalating costs of welfare. Their most urgent priority is to contain the cost. More 
important, existing social services are often being criticized not only as inefficient, but 
also insensitive to the needs of users. The issues of escalating costs, rising complaints 
and dissatisfaction among users towards public services and helping professionals can 
be attributed to the shortcomings of the basic public service structure and culture. 
There is a new calling for a new approach to re-structure and reform the public 
service. The shortcomings, failings and inadequacies of the public sector will be 
addressed by transplanting the management practices, languages and values from the 
commercial sectors to the civil service. It is believed that the private sector is more 
efficient. The major difference between the public and private sector is the role of the 
market. Traditionally, public sector is marked by the absence of market and 
competition. Governments in developed countries are enthusiastically introducing of 
competition or market/quasi-market mechanism and discipline into publicly-financed 
or tax-based social services. It is commonly believed by market-oriented governments 
that quality improvement in public services can only be achieved when there is a 
competition among providers for customers and resources. Competition enables both 
customers and funding bodies the choice for more effective and less costly providers. 
 In sum, governments in Europe, North America and Australia have popularly 
and enthusiastically employed this new management model to engineer public sector 
reforms. The introduction of market mechanisms in social welfare in Hong Kong has 
major implications. Is the market-oriented changes in Hong Kong more rhetoric than 
reality? Are non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Hong Kong committed and 
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prepared to operate in this market-oriented and competitive environment? 
 
THE RISE OF MANAGERIALISM 
There is a general dissatisfaction among the government administrators and the 
general public with regards to the present mode of public and social service delivery. 
Governments have become over-involved in the provision of these services. These 
services are costly, bureaucratic, and dominated by professionals and service 
providers. Not only is that services are insensitive and non-responsive to the needs of 
users. “Managerialism” is a loose term referring to the application of concepts, 
techniques and practice of management of commercial organizations in private sector 
to public sector (Harden, 1992; Pollitt, 1993; Dunleavy and Hood, 1994). 1  
“Managerialism” has become a dominant ideology, structure and practice affecting 
public service reforms which have overriding influences over social welfare 
programmes and social work professional practice. As such, managerialism is closely 
associated with those terms such as “marketization”, “privatization”, “contracting 
out”, and “purchase of service”. Implicitly, the governments acknowledged the 
superiority of the values and culture of the private sector that focus on efficiency, 
productivity and performance. The rising concern of the adoption of market values in 
social policy, particularly in the United Kingdom has been discussed in a number of 
studies (Taylor-Gooby and Lawson, 1993; Cutler and Waine, 1994; Butcher, 1995; 
Wistow, et al., 1996; Clarke and Newman, 1997). It emphasizes the use of rational 
approach which requires clear objectives and strategies, performance indicators and 
measurement of outcomes. More importantly, the service orientation has shifted from 
supply-led and professional-dominated provisions to demand-led services impelled by 
the needs of users (Farnham and Horton, 1993, pp.237-238). 
 The driving force for public sector reforms is not that market works, but the 
belief that the private sector is more efficient than the public sector. Competition can 
promote efficiency, accountability, and performance, as well as empower service 
users. With the introduction of market and consumerist ideology, the following 
principles are accepted: 
? Market mechanism (internal market) should be used whenever possible; Market 
enhances value for money and efficiency. 
? Competition should be established between providers of services; Competition 
leads to quality improvement and service responsiveness. 
? Service users are empowered through the provision service information and 
maximization of choices (include the choice to opt out of government provisions). 
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? Government provisions should be kept to a minimum, mainly in financing, 
purchasing, monitoring and regulating services (Flynn, 1990) 
Besides wholesale privatization, governments can adopt the following measures: 
1. Devolving financial control: 
To create internal and external market within the public services, the bureaucratic 
service delivery system should be decentralized into independent service units or cost 
centres with more financial and operational autonomy, and would have to compete 
with one another for new projects and funding. Each hospital, school, and social 
centre should have its own independent budgetary control. Financial allocations 
would be based on performance, linking to service output. For example, the principle 
of “money following patients/students” should be put in practice. Each unit, in 
principle, has to earn its own income to cover costs, and pay for the purchase of 
services from other units or organizations. Within the internal market, the unit can be 
both purchaser and provider of different services. Surpluses accumulated in one 
service can be deployed to pay for other services. For external market, outside 
providers are invited to compete for service contracts. Operating under the market 
environment based on internal and external pricing and charging, mechanism, service 
managers would have the incentives to improve efficiency. 
2. Compulsory competitive bidding 
The purchaser invites outside contractors to tender for the work in competition with 
the in-house unit. The outside contractor could be a public or private body. (If the in 
house unit wins the contract, the service is not contracted out). Tendering is used for 
market testing, providing information about market costs and ways to improve 
efficiency. Services should go through market testing in which outside agencies are 
invited to compete with the public service units for service contracts. Accordingly, the 
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link between the service provider and purchaser is through formal or legal contracts. 
3. Contracting out: 
The international experiences show that the “contract revolution” of public 
services is the driving force for reforms (Saltman and Otter, 1992; Ovretveit, 1995; 
Walsh, et al., 1997; Gilbelman and Demone, 1998). The prevailing belief is that it is 
better to purchase the service from the market than to provide it directly by the 
government. Not only is the fact that contracting out usually involves a lower cost, it 
can avoid the conflict of roles. The separation of functions of the purchaser and 
provider so that the purchasers do not have a direct interest in providing them. In this 
way, the service purchaser (the government) can be more objective in assessing needs 
and choosing providers. 
The purchaser would now focus on determining the needs of the users, choosing 
the most appropriate service provider, and monitoring their performance. More 
importantly, the purchasers have to know clearly what he/she wants and be able to 
specify the requirements. The role of the state is that of the ‘enabling state’, ‘steering 
not rowing’ the boat (Walsh, 1995, p.220). 
Contracts involve the specification of contract requirements in terms of inputs, 
cost, methods employed outputs, workload, or even outcomes. Contracts can a take a 
variety of forms. Some are fixed price or block contract, while others can be paid 
according to volume of output. In general, purchaser looks for maximum volume and 
quality of services at the lowest available cost. Provider would try to secure the 
commitment of the purchaser at a good price as possible. The arrangement would 
structure incentives so as to achieve cost-effectiveness. The use of contracting out has 
been very widespread among more concrete and specific public services, such as 
refuse collection and disposal, catering, laundry, maintenance work, and basic supply. 
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It is extending rapidly to other professional services, such as engineering, law, 
management and computer services, and to social and health services in most 
developed countries. 
The contracting mechanism would involve the separation of purchaser and 
provider. The government, as the purchaser, would mainly involve in choosing the 
appropriate provider through the competitive tendering system. The essential issues 
remain how to ensure quality assurance and that contractors carry out their 
responsibilities, what kind of penalty can be levied on those who fail to perform and 
complete contracts, and how to minimize risks and uncertainties. A new mechanism is 
essential to resolve the new kinds of conflicts involved. The traditional trust 
relationship between the government and NGOs would be at risks. 
4. Monitoring Performance: 
To enhance accountability and ensure quality assurance, performance measurement 
is essential. The service provision now is based on contractual agreement rather than 
mutual trust as in the past. Thus, besides the need to have specified and measurable 
performance standards and requirements, often in the form of measurable indicators 
listed out in the service agreements, the mechanism of inspection, monitoring and 
auditing becomes essential. The measurement would enable comparison of 
performance among providers. Performance indicators ideally should be focused on 
outcome and impact of the programmes, rather than on input and output. The 
experiences of other countries showed that the number of performance indicators will 
proliferate, to an extent, that they turn out to become difficult to reflect service quality 
and performance (Walsh, 1995, p.243). On the one hand, government allocations 
would then be based on performance. Market disciplines and incentives linking 
reward to performance are regarded as essential. On the other hand, service providers 
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are required to publish their performance publicly so that users can make their choice 
based on performance. Of course, outcome measurements and evaluation have always 
been a controversial and difficult area in social service. 
 
5. Charging for service 
Prices and charges are essential information of the market, reflecting real costs 
and users’ demand. Wastefulness would be reduced if services are charged. In the past, 
users charges are not common in public and social services. But with the need to 
increase revenue, the use of charging and pricing becomes more popular and 
widespread. In addition, internal charges for are used for an organizational unit paying 
for the services it receives from another. These services can include central 
administrative support. For those services where charges are not possible, the 
mechanism of voucher would be used. The system operates by providing a public 
subsidy in the form of a voucher of a given value, which can be used to purchase a 
given service. Under such schemes, public service suppliers are obligated to compete 
with private or voluntary sector alternatives, and voucher holders may purchase the 
service where they will (Culter and Waine, 1994: 15). 
The introduction of charging for services may discourage usage and service 
take-up. 
6. From clients and citizens to customers 
 
One of the most important orientations learned from the business practice is to be 
“close to the customer”. To be successful, social services are expected to meet or 
exceed the expectations of their users. To empower the customers, social services 
should seek their views and opinion, maximize their choice, provide them with 
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information on service standards, commit to improve service quality, make 
performance pledges, survey their satisfaction, encourage their participation in the 
programme decisions, and make services more accessible. In enhancing 
accountability, complaint procedures are strengthened through various complaint 
mechanisms and ombudsman schemes. In the United Kingdom, the endorsement of 
the value of customer sovereignty marked by the publication of the “Citizen’s 
Charter” and other social services charters in the 1990s. 
The Citizen’s Charter has four main themes: 
? to improve the quality of public services; 
? to provide choice, whenever possible, between competing providers; 
? to tell citizens what service standards are and how to act where service is 
unacceptable; and 
? to give full value for money within a tax bill the nation can afford. 
 
In short, the Charter implies more privatization, increased competition; further 
contracting out; publication of performance standards and service information; 
effective complaint procedures; independent service audits. The customer orientation 
has been criticized for its shift of focus from citizens to customers. Instead of the 
promotion of citizenship based on entitlement based on need and rights, the 
consumerist approach is modeled after the market situation of entitlement based on 
consumer payment. The Citizen’s Charter is essentially a consumer’s charter. As 
expected, service agencies will become more user-friendly with improved compliant, 
communication and information system. Yet user involvement in the setting of service 
contracts and the selection of providers would still be limited. Finally, the basic 
contradiction between consumerism and increasingly limited resources in public 
Managerialism in Hong Kong 
service can become apparent, and users can in reality have to face strict eligibility, 
limited choices, and poor service quality. 
Osborne and Gaebler (1992, p.19-20) concisely summarized the essential 
features of the “new managerialism” prevailing in the public sector: 
Entrepreneurial governments promote competition between service providers. 
They empower citizens by pushing control out of the bureaucracy into the 
community. They measure the performance of their agencies, focusing not on 
inputs but outcomes. They are driven by their goals – their missions – not by 
their rules and regulations. They define their clients as customers and offer them 
choices – between schools, between training programmes, between housing 
options. They prevent problems before they emerge, rather than simply offer 
services afterwards. They put their energies into earning money, not simply 
spending it. They decentralize authority, embracing participatory management. 
 
Even though, there is still a lack of conclusive evidence, governments around the 
world are convinced that the market-oriented approach to welfare services, notably 
through the purchase of services are effective means to save money, increase 
efficiency and reduce the size of the bureaucracy. Notwithstanding the difficulties in 
the calculation of costs and making comparison, a review of the existing scattered 
research findings in different countries tended to show that contracting out and 
competitive tendering in specific and manual services, such as refuse collection, 
catering, and clearning, can result in substantial savings on direct costs in the 
short-term (Walsh, 1995, chapter 9). Savings can come from a mixture of improved 
working methods and cuts in staff costs (reduced pay, increased workload). The 
estimation of precise transaction costs (costs in introducing the new system, such as 
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consultancy fees, capital investment, preparing the tendering process and contracts, 
training, auditing and monitoring) is difficult. However, the results are less clear with 
professional, core and complex services. More importantly, the findings on the impact 
of service quality are more controversial. It is often criticized that efficiency gains are 
achieved at the expense of service quality. Experiences in other countries showed that 
it is usual to have providers, especially private sector, withdrawing from contracts 
simply because of difficulties in meeting the terms under which they were required to 
do (Walsh, 1995, p.240). The purchaser has to be prepared to face the problem of 
maintaining services after contractors have failed to perform effectively or gone into 
liquidation. 
There is a formidable risk of directly transplanting the values and practices of 
private or commercial sector into the public sector. Non-commercial values and 
polices (equality and needs) can be neglected. As such most market-oriented reforms 
would result in the breeding of a hybrid.  
In introducing marketization of social welfare services, the government has to be 
cautious to: 
- apply the experiences of private for-profit sector to the welfare sector. 
- select services that can be strategically contract out. 
- learn from experiences of other countries which may have a more stronger culture 
supporting contracting out. 
 
The Hong Kong Initiatives 
 Even though the Hong Kong government has all along cherished the governing 
principle of “small government” or “positive non-intervention”, it has in fact been 
actively involved in the financing and provision of a variety of public and social 
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services. In general, the economic recession after 1997, the complaints of bureaucratic 
inefficiency and the worry of the government that social service expenditure is 
running out of control because of growing entitlements and escalating costs of 
services are factors contributing to determination of the government to look for 
market-oriented reforms in social service. Meanwhile, there is growing dissatisfaction 
with regards to the performance of professionals notably medical doctors. There are 
growing complaints on their ethical standards and money-oriented help 
 There is a growing concern of the SAR government to increase efficiency, 
contain rising costs, and achieve value for money. 
 
The Hong Kong government now  
Under a weak and uncertain economy, the government is striving to contain 
staggering public expenditures, cutting costs, improving performance. 
To enhance productivity, performance and cost effectiveness of the government, 
the Hong Kong government is expected to introduce competition and market 
mechanism into the civil service. On top of the move towards privatization and 
corporatization which enables departments to operate in a manner closer to the market 
and free from rigid government rules (SCMP, 1/4/99, p.6). Housing Department to the 
private sector, the increased in the sales of public housing units, the sales of the 
MTRC shares, represent some of the moves of the government toward partial 
privatization.1 Public housing (rising rent and sales of public housing) 
                                                 
Therefore, cost-reduction or containment, increased accountability, and cost-effectiveness are issues 
high on the government’s agenda. Following the efficiency drive modeled after the private sector, 
reforms may imply layoffs, forced or voluntary early retirement,  
More importantly, even with the savings derived from efficiency gains, there are little additional 
resources for new services (South China Morning Post, 3 September 1999, p.6). 
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Increasing charges on selected medical treatments. 
In university education, raising fees and charging interests on student loans. In health 
care financing, the Hong Kong government is expected to establish an insurance 
system which requires mandatory contribution from employees and employers (South 
China Morning Post, 26 March 1999, p.6). 2  The suggestions or the threat of 
privatization, as a means of “market testing” become frequent.  
 
 With the economic recession, the Hong Kong government has shown worries 
over the mounting expenses on social services. Annual subvention to 
government-aided social services  
in health, education and social welfare amounted to $75 billion, about 40 per cent of 
the government’s recurrent budget. In Chief Executive introduced the Enhanced 
Productivity Scheme in 1998. Not surprisingly, the Chief Secretary commented: 
We are glad the subvented bodies have responded to the enhanced productivity 
programme, but to further develop their potential we need to introduce 
fundamental reforms in terms of the service needs, the mode of subvention and 
funding arrangements (South China Morning Post, 1 April 1999, p.6). 
There are growing distrust of professionals, notably medical doctors, including the 
accusation of overcharging, abusing antibiotics and providing poor quality health by 
the Harvard Report on Health Care and rising complaints (SCMP, 28 July 1999:2). 
 
                                                                                                                                            
 
1 These privatization moves reflect a mixed of objectives. While the sales of MTR shares can be 
regarded a means to raise revenue, the contract out of public housing management responsibilities to 
private sectors represents a way to cut costs. It is reported that the Housing Department management 
costs per flat per month 80% more than private management (Mingbao, 6 March 1999, p.8). 
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Problems of the Existing System  
 
Over 90 per cent of the welfare expenses are financed by the public fund. 
Welfare expenses are escalating because of the rising demands and rising costs. In a 
way, the Hong Kong government has long “purchased” services from NGOs. 
The subvention system can be described as an “iron rice bowl”. NGOs are guaranteed 
with the allocations each year with little regard to their performance. Allocation of 
new projects again is not based on previous performance records. Any savings or 
‘unspent balance’ have returned to the government. There is little in-built incentives 
for efficiency and performance. In stead of making any savings, NGOs are 
encouraged to use up all their allocations. This would become the basis for asking for 
more. 
The present problems with the welfare delivery system: 
Subvention to individual NGO was based on actual costs. Variations of amount of 
subvention exist for identical size and types of services. 
In 1995, the SWD contracted a management consultant firm to make 
recommendations to “streamline and simplify the current system; to introduce 
performance-based funding and service agreements; to develop performance 
measurement standards – both quantitive and qualitative; and to suggest appropriate 
incentives and sanctions. Based on the recommendations from the Management 
Consultants, the Social Welfare Department recommended the following changes: 
1. Block grant subvention: With a more simpler subvention system, NGOs can have 
the flexibility to make best use of the subvention 
2. The Service and Funding Agreement, Service Quality Standards, and Service 
Performance Monitoring System: These arrangements would improve the quality 
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and quantity of services. 
 
In social welfare, the Hong Kong government has not been a major provider. Some 70 
per cent of the social welfare services are provided by NGOs, often with full financial 
support from the government. 
The problems: 
Each year, the government allocated subvention directly to NGOs through a 
budgetary process which routinely rolls forward with minor incremental adjustments. 
In a way, NGOs are guaranteed with the funds, and there is little incentives for them 
to be responsive to the needs and preferences of their users. 
Competition is minimal, no comparison of performance. No discrimination between 
the performing and the poor performing service units. No incentives to improve 
quality and efficiency. 
Services structure lacks flexibility. 
Subvention is not tied to performance. 
Coordination rather than competition. 
No freedom to set labour cost at their own rates of pay for all the staff. 




The consultants have recommended: 
a) clearer sets of performance measurement should be introduced to make NGOs 
more accountable for their service quality; 
b) the input-based funding system should be changed so as to provide more flexibility 
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to NGOs to manage their resources; and 
c) a cultural change should be initiated to arouse the Sector’s awareness of the need 
to deliver services in a responsive, cost-effectiveness and competitive manner. 
 
The SWD introduced the Service Performance Monitoring System in 1999. The 
system consists of 19 Service Quality Standards (SQS) and Funding and Service 
Agreements (FSA) between the government as a funder and NGOs as service 
providers. The Service Quality Standards are to be implemented over a period of three 
years (1999-2001). Included in each FSA are service definition, nature of services, 
performance standards, obligations of SWD to service operators, and the basis of 
subvention. Again, in three phases, the FSA on the 103 subvented services will be 
fully introduced by 2002. Each NGOs and SWD service unit has to make both 
self-assessment to be conducted by the service unit itself and an external assessment 
by the Service Performance Section of SWD. Service units have to satisfy the 
prescribed performance standards which include the SQSs, essential service 
requirements and performance output. 
In the subvention system, SWD initially recommended the “Unit grant” system. 
Under the system, NGOs which deliver the same type and quality of services would 
receive the same lvel of subvention based on the average of the actual subvention for 




In accepting the market mechanism, the Elderly Commission Report on Housing and 
Residential Services (1999) recommended:  
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The Government should create an environment conducive to healthy competition, 
in tandem with the development of a mixed economy of service provision, to 
offer more choice to the elderly and raise service quality through competition in 
the market. 
 
The meanings of the Service Agreements and Performance Contract: 
The Agreement is intended to say no to the previous automatic allocation of resourcs 
to NGOs. 
- Funding will not be automatic. 
- Allocation will be based on competition between NGOs. 
- Competition will be major tool for promoting choice, cost-effectiveness and 
innovation. 
- NGOs are expected to face competition from other NGOs and for-profit sectors, 
and they have to improve their quality and reduce inefficiency. 




Should the elderly people continue to enjoy heavily government subsidized long-term 
care? With the mounting number of elderly, the government simply cannot afford to 
do so. Universal benefits will be gone. The government just cannot provide both 
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Contracting out in Home help, establishing the contracting unit in social welfare 
department 
EPP 
Part-time and salary cut. 
Following the guidelines issued by the Civil Service Bureau allowing flexibility in 
setting salaries for new staff, the Director of Social Welfare announced in March 1999 
that new recruits of the Department will be on contract terms and receive 30 per cent 
salary cut (South China Morning Post, 26 March 1999, p.4). 
 
Now new experimental projects and the new modified mode of home help service will 
be on “block grants”. The introduction competitive bidding for home help services 
with flexibility in staff arrangements and operational structure would signify the 
return of “block grants” under a different format (借屍還魂). 
 
Received resounding opposition from NGOs. 
 
EPP 
Fundamental Expenditure Review Exercise on youth services, was studied again by 
another private management consultant firm. 
Competitive bidding of home help services 
NGOs should have more discretion in managing their budgets. 
 
Service and Funding Agreements 
 
In the first phase, funding and service agreements have been developed for 35 types 
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of services. These agreements consist of the generic sections (obligations of SWD, 
performance monitoring, SWD’s role in overseeing the performance of service 
operators) and service-specific sections (service definition and performance 
standards). 
These agreements fail to specify expected results and outcome in measurable terms. 
 
Contract conditions, methods of dealing with risk, ensuring quality, how to cope with 
problems of unsatisfactory performance. Specify provision for contract termination 
for failure of performance. Block contracts, not cost per case. 
They are in fact not legal contracts, written in everyday language. They lack the 
details like those in the commercial sector 
The legal status of these agreements is unclear. 
What is the meaning of these agreements? Are there shared interpretations of these 




With the establishment of the Funding and Service Agreements, a new mode of 
service monitoring would emerge. The newly established Service Performance and 
Monitoring Unit of the SWD would be responsible to oversee that the performance of 
both SWD and subvented service units would have internal/ self assessment annually 
and by the SPMS unit externally once every three years. Service units which satisfy 
the all the requirements listed in the FSA would continue to receive their subvention, 
while those which do not comply with all the standards will be asked to prepare action 
plans and take steps to make improvement. 





 There are more reviews on the effectiveness and functions of social welfare 
services. The Fundamental Efficiency/Expenditure Review on youth services, review 
of school social work, Neighbourhood Level Community Development Projects in 
Old Urban Areas, and a number of elderly services are recent examples. More 
importantly, the government is more convinced of the role of private management 
consultants in these reviews.   
 
 
Competitive Bidding and Contracting out 
 
It has been an essential financial management practice in NGO to allocate capital 
projects based on compulsory competitive tendering. In recent years, NGOs have to 
submit proposals to bid for new projects.  
 
“To re-engineer the home-help services, the services were separated into home care 
service and meal service. Both are allocated through competitive bidding. 
Competitors have to bid for the project for a price which would not be standardised. 
Furthermore, the successful bidders would have the flexibility in the deployment of 
resources. In a sense, this is a form of block grant. 
Who would bid for these projects? 
The interest of the private sector in the field is still uncertain. But to a lot of NGOs, 
Managerialism in Hong Kong 
the threat of new entrants into the social welfare field is formidable and worrisome. 
The bidding system would definitely favour those large NGOs. There is very little 
market information regarding the interests of the private sector to participate in social 
service projects. To what extent, the private for-profit sector would have comparative 
advantages over NGOs, or vice versa? NGOs would be “handicapped” by their social 
values and concern with qualities while for-profit private sector would worry about 
the fact that NGO enjoy subsidized resources (use of Lotteries Fund for capital 
development and facility improvement) which make the competition unfair. 
In the UK experience, because of the lack of trust towards private for-profit sector, 
local authorities tend to give more favourable contractual terms to NGOs (Walsh, et 
al., 1997: 188). 
Would NGOs equip to cope with the new contract culture? 
Would there be savings? Savings can only be achieved at the expense of quality.  
 
The present approach is mainly ‘market testing’, trying to find out the interests of the 
private sector in social welfare provisions. Through the inclusion of ‘external’ 
providers and the introduction of competition among NGO themselves in the social 





Under the tight financial situation, no additional resource allocation for welfare 
is expected. Even worse, in line with the government policy of Enhanced Productivity 
Programme, all government and subvented units have to achieve a three per cent 
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savings in three years. Savings are considered as EPP only if there are permanent 
reduction in the entitled subvention allocation. In other words, NGO would be 
expected to look for means to enhance efficiency.  
EPP. 
NGOs are still struggling with how to achieve the target of reducing the operating 
expenditure of five per cent in three years (2000-2003) (Welfare Digest, March 1999, 
p.1-2). 
 
Bought Place Scheme 
 
Contract-based employment. Delinked from civil service master pay scale. Salary 
adjusted according to market conditions (starting with non-professionals) (MP, 28 
July 1999: 5). 
 
Social work supervisors retitled as social work managers, NGO directors as chief 





Implications for Social Welfare and Social Work Practice 
 
Borrowing the culture and practice from the business sector, the whole reform 
movements is towards enhancing cost effectiveness and service quality through the 
development and use of measurable indicators and standards, resource allocations 
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based on performance. Many overseas experiences show that contracting out and 
competitive bidding can lead to efficiency savings. But critics claimed that the 
savings are gained at the expense of quality of services. 
 The development of market mechanism in social welfare in Hong Kong is only 
at the early stage. It is neither possible at this stage to make a conclusive evaluation 
on its effectiveness nor to assess on the specific impact of marketization movement. 
At this stage of ‘market testing’, we can project some results: 
? extending the service providers to private commercial sector, other 
government units, and other types of NGOs. 
? Some more concrete services can easily attract more providers while others 
would be too complicated to contract out. 
? To become primarily the purchaser of service output, the role of the SWD in 
direct service provision would be reduced gradually. Accordingly, more of 
the existing SWD services would be contracted out. Its future role should be 
limited to need assessment, strategic planning, resource allocation, setting 
performance targets, and monitoring performance. 
? NGOs would have more discretion in financial control and operational 
autonomy. 
? With the introduction of market mechanism, competition is expected among 
NGOs, between NGOs and other sectors (government, non-welfare NGOs, 
and private) for resources, staff, users, and funds. 
? NGOs are forced to examine their existing practice, and be aware of the costs 
of the services that they deliver. 
Overall speaking, this changes entail a new relationship between the government 
and NGOs. The introduction of contractual relationships would affect the balance of 
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power between the government, NGOs and service users. 
 Again, savings can be achieved, particularly through the lowering of pay and 
working conditions of the staff. With the expected deregulation of the salary structure 
of NGOs, beginning with the non-professional staff.  
More services will be selected for market-testing. More complex services require a 
more complicated form of contract and risk. More importantly, widespread use of 
contracting would invite stern resistance from NGOs. Therefore, the popular use of 
contract will not be developed, at least in the short-term. 
There is a high expectation among government officials in Hong Kong. 
Would all these reforms under the auspices of managerialism and marketization 
represent a basic transformation of the whole welfare system, or just some tinkering 
with the present system? The government may fully endorse the market and 
managerial philosophies, but it apparently still does not have a blue-print or master 
plan for wholesale reform. In the foreseeable future, changes will still be incremental, 
mainly for “market testing.” Evidently, the government is actively looking forward to 
expand the scope for contracting. But the practice, effectiveness, legal and ethical 
issues of contracting out have to be explored. 
 
The traditional stability in funding will be gone. Under the contract system, not only 
the funding of the project would be time limited, the contractual conditions will most 
likely have to be changed every time the contract is up for renewal or re-bidding. 
What is the role of the HKCSS? 
Why so many NGO, large and small in size? Mergering of agencies together. 
Can a semi-statutory social welfare authority, similar to the Hospital Authority and 
Housing Authority be established to administer all the programs? 
Managerialism in Hong Kong 
Some inefficient and bureaucratic? 
 
Competition and market mechanism implies the strong need for NGOs to market and 
advertise their services, and more aggressive public relations work. They are cost to 
be included. 
 
High demands for management skills. Some social work positions are already retitled 
as managers. One third of the training courses supported by the Social Work Training 
Fund are related to management skills. The core competency of assistant social work 
officers covers a wide range of management skills and knowledge. 
 
Under the present atmosphere of a economic recession, NGOs have learned that only 
“performance” or “productivity” can justify for request from the government for more 
resources. 
 
With little surprise, we would expect the Hong Kong government to continue to 
establish quasi-markets in public and social services. Under the board strategy of 
privatization, more welfare services would be contracted out through competitive 
tendering. 
The approach changes the welfare delivery from a professional toward a managerial 
mode, expecting the professionals to be more concern with efficiency and costs.  
Social workers as care managers and supervisors, unit managers (Sheppard, 1995) 
 
This is the new culture and new “rules of the game” which NGOs and social workers 
have to learn effectively in order to “survive” or be “excellent”. 
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In the future, there will be no such thing as “fully subvented service”. NGOs have to 
reconsider carefully. They can no longer count on the government solely for funding 
support. NGOs with more than 90 per cent funding support from the government with 
low fund raising and fund generating capacity would be in jeopardy in the long run. 
Likewise, NGOs which can subsidize the service (provide value-added service) would 
have comparative advantages to bid new projects. 
Under the contracting arrangement, the power difference between NGOs and the 
government is becoming more obvious. In social service, it is exceedingly difficult to 
demonstrate effectiveness. 
In both cases, the bargaining positions of NGOs in relation to the government, and of 
social workers in relation to their administrators will be further eroded. That would be 
demoralizing both to the professional as a whole and to the NGO sector. Uncertainties, 
insecurities and anxiety will be the dominant sentiment in the field. 
 
Staff: fear of redundancy  
 
On the surface, managerialism involves a wide array of reforms and changes. But just 
how deep these changes go, and what they imply for Hong Kong’s social welfare 
system as a whole in the long term, remains an open question. 
 
? NGOs should be entrepreneurial. 
? NGOs should try contracting services to private or other non-profit sectors, in 
areas such as cleaning, security, meal preparation. 
 
A call for new culture in public and social services 
Managerialism in Hong Kong 
The process of introducing basic changes is conflict-ridden. There is the contradiction 
between value for money and quality. 
Change also puts pressure and stress on staff, often in the form of layoffs, reduced 
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1 New form of managerial-oriented approach to public sector reform has been 
described as “Contracting State” (Harden, 1992), “Reinvention of government” 
(Osborne and Gaebler, 1992), “New Managerialism” (Pollitt,1993), and “New public 
Management” (Dunleavy and Hood, 1994). 
2 Currently, patients pay $68 a day for a public hospital bed and $44 for a specialist consultation – 
only two to three percent of the real cost. 
